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any people now enjoy levels of prosperity that would have been
barely imaginable a few hundred years ago. That remarkable
achievement can be viewed through the lens of productivity sta-
tistics that give quantitative estimates of output per unit of input. By studying
productivity, analysts can improve their understanding of the causes of national
prosperity and economic growth. Since different deﬁnitions of productivity are
widely used, this article reviews the most important ones used in the United
States. The article also contains a brief sketch of the historical behavior of
productivity and then warns readers about potential pitfalls in using produc-
tivity statistics. Finally, the background material is used to address questions
concerning the recent behavior of productivity statistics.
1. WHAT EXACTLY IS PRODUCTIVITY?
Simply stated, productivity is output per unit of input. Actually calculating
a number can be somewhat more complicated. Suppose that we can agree






where Y is aggregate output, K is the capital stock, L is labor input, t is a time-
period index, ® is a number between zero and one, and A will be discussed
later. For national productivity statistics, an obvious starting point is to take an
estimate of aggregate output such as real gross domestic product (GDP) from
the National Input and Product Accounts (NIPAs). On the input side, the ﬁrst
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requirement is to measure labor input, such as the number of workers or the
number of hours worked.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) currently publishes three categories
of productivity estimates, which in terms of equation (1) are simply of the form
Y/L. The most widely cited category is published quarterly and takes an output
measure from the NIPAs for a large sector of the economy. Business product
is the portion of real GDP produced by the business sector, and thus excludes
production from the household sector, the foreign sector, and the government
sector. Nonfarm business, naturally, is business product minus farm production.
Product of nonﬁnancial corporations further excludes production by ﬁnancial
ﬁrms and by proprietorships and partnerships. Also, as part of its quarterly es-
timates, the BLS publishes productivity statistics for the manufacturing sector.
In 1992, business product accounted for 76 percent of GDP, nonfarm busi-
ness product was 75 percent of GDP, nonfarm nonﬁnancial corporate business
product was 52 percent of GDP, and manufacturing product was 17 percent
of GDP. Since the only input considered is hours worked, these estimates are
often described as labor productivity. Most of the data on employee-hours
comes from the BLS’s establishment survey, although for some workers other
sources are used.
The BLS publishes a second category of estimates annually, using a more
comprehensive deﬁnition of inputs into the production process; the result is
referred to as multifactor, or total-factor, productivity and is represented by
the term A in equation (1). The statistic is estimated by dividing product of a
broad sector by an input index that is a weighted average of two indexes, one
of labor inputs and the other of capital inputs. The index of labor inputs can be
thought of as a quality-adjusted labor index; for broad sectors it is calculated
as a weighted average of employee-hours for several groups of workers. The
groups are deﬁned by sex, level of education, and amount of experience. The
capital input index is a weighted average of capital services from many different
categories of structures, equipment, inventories, and land.
In both the quarterly and annual estimates, productivity in the narrow
manufacturing sector is calculated using input and output measures that differ
from the measures used to estimate productivity in the broader sectors. Man-
ufacturing productivity is therefore not strictly comparable to the broad-sector
estimates. For multifactor productivity, manufacturing labor input does not re-
ceive the demographic adjustments that the labor input receives for broader
sectors. In addition to labor and capital, manufacturing’s aggregate input in-
dex includes purchases of energy, other raw materials, and business services.
Those additional items are crucial, since purchased inputs account for the bulk
of manufacturing costs. With regard to output, the manufacturing measure is
gross output, excluding shipments within the manufacturing sector. In contrast,
for the broader sectors, output represents value added; accordingly, the value
of material inputs is subtracted from gross output.        
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The BLS publishes a third category of estimates for particular industries.
In this category, they estimate labor productivity for 150 speciﬁc industries,
again using a different methodology from the other two categories. Multifactor
productivity is also calculated for a smaller number of industries. The BLS ﬁrst
estimated industry productivity in 1898 in response to congressional concerns
over the employment effects of labor-saving technology. Today, the choice of
which industries to cover depends on data availability and therefore is heavily
tilted toward manufacturing. Nonetheless, the BLS estimates productivity for
important industries outside manufacturing, including mining, communications,
banking, trade, and transportation. In these industry estimates, output indexes
measure gross output and are taken from census surveys. The labor input is
measured by employee-hours, without demographic adjustments. For multi-
factor productivity calculations, capital services and intermediate purchases
supplement the labor input.
In order to supplement the BLS productivity estimates, many analysts con-
struct their own numbers. Since GDP and population estimates are available for
relatively lengthy time spans for many countries, GDP divided by population
is often used as a rough estimate of labor productivity. Either the numerator
or the denominator of this output-per-person ratio can be reﬁned. Most impor-
tantly, instead of population, one could use the labor force, employment, or
employee-hours. Many analysts also construct their own estimates of multifac-
tor productivity. The main requirement is to have a method to construct an input
index; in equation (1), for example, the input index is K®L1¡®. By construct-
ing one’s own multifactor productivity index, an analyst can include the most
relevant factors of production. Thus one might distinguish between skilled and
unskilled labor or between privately owned and government-owned physical
capital. Finally, industry productivity estimates have often been constructed
directly from the NIPA measures of output by sector, which by deﬁnition rep-
resent value added rather than gross output.
2. POTENTIAL PITFALLS AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES
Any meaningful interpretation of national productivity statistics must account
for the following potential pitfalls.
(1) Current estimates of productivity understate both its level and rate of
growth. That bias reﬂects a basic difﬁculty in estimating real output. Real GDP,
for example, is estimated by taking spending for over 1,000 separate categories,
adjusting each spending estimate for price change, and summing the resulting
estimates of real expenditure. The weak link in this chain is the adjustment for
price change. Current procedures systematically overstate changes in prices and
thereby understate both levels and rates of change of real GDP and productivity.      
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How large is the bias? A large volume of research has produced credible
estimates for a large fraction of GDP; biases for a few items are mentioned
below.
(a) Consumer spending accounted for 68 percent of GDP in 1996. A panel
of experts (Boskin 1996) estimated that the rate of increase in the Consumer
Price Index (CPI) was overstated by 1.1 percent per year in the mid-1990s.
A large part of that bias is due to two related factors: inadequately ac-
counting for the beneﬁts of new goods that are not included in the CPI
and inadequately accounting for the changing quality of items included in
the CPI. When statisticians prepare estimates of real GDP, most prices for
consumer spending are taken from the CPI, so much of that bias is carried
over into the deﬂator for consumer spending.1 One category of spending
that does not use a price from the CPI is ﬁnancial services such as checking
accounts. Nominal amounts here are deﬂated by a procedure that assumes
zero productivity growth. In contrast, the BLS productivity estimate for
the banking industry found that productivity grew at a 2.0 percent annual
rate from 1979 to 1990.
(b) Spending for nonresidential structures accounted for 3 percent of
GDP in 1996. In many cases no price index has been constructed for
deﬂating spending on these items, so a proxy such as an input price
index is used. One analyst (Pieper 1990) estimates that this procedure tends
to overstate new construction prices by at least 0.5 percent per year. Robert
Gordon (1996a) noted that the ofﬁcial productivity index for construction
has either declined or grown slowly for decades. The measured produc-
tivity level in U.S. construction has thus fallen by an implausible two-thirds
relative to the Canadian productivity level in construction.
(c) Spending for producers’ durable equipment accounted for 7 percent of
GDP in 1996. A major study of a wide variety of evidence led Gordon
(1990) to conclude that the implicit price deﬂator for producer durables
overstated inﬂation in this category by 2.9 percent. Again, the main
problem is that many of the prices of individual items come from pro-
ducer price indexes that make inadequate allowance for new goods that
are excluded from the indexes and for changes in quality of goods in-
cluded in the indexes. The size of the bias is now probably less than
1 The CPI in 1997 was based on the goods and services consumers bought during 1982,
1983, and 1984. The implicit price deﬂator for consumer spending in the NIPAs, however, is
based on the recent pattern of goods and services purchased, and that pattern changes each year.
This difference in 1997 caused the CPI to overstate inﬂation by a greater amount than did the
GDP price index for consumer spending. In 1998, the CPI will use an updated bundle of goods
and services that, for a time, should narrow the difference between rates of change of the two
indexes.   
R. H. Webb: National Productivity Statistics 49
Gordon found, however, due to important methodological changes by the
statistical agencies.
(d) A large part of government services consists of employee compen-
sation, which accounted for 10 percent of GDP in 1996. Construction of
real output in this category again assumes zero productivity growth. In
contrast, productivity in a large number of federal civilian programs is
estimated to have grown at a 1.5 percent annual rate (Kendrick 1991).
In short, current estimates of the level and growth rate of real GDP are bi-
ased downward by a substantial amount, and therefore estimates of productivity
that are based on GDP are similarly biased, including all the BLS measures.
These problems are not unique to the United States but are inherent in every
country’s statistical program. The major difﬁculty is that taking estimates of
current dollar spending and disentangling real output and prices is difﬁcult
in an economy with rapid innovation. Nonetheless, research within statistical
agencies and by academic economists has identiﬁed promising approaches for
addressing some of the problems. An outstanding example is the research that
led to quantifying the changing quality of computers in the United States. This
change, implemented in the mid-1980s, had such large consequences that it led
to the introduction of a new statistical formula, chain weighting, into the NIPAs
in the 1990s. Both changes have substantially improved our understanding of
the behavior of economic activity over the last few decades. What is lacking
is the funding needed for additional basic research, for applied research on
the practical methods needed to implement potential improvements for routine
production of statistics, and for additional surveys to gather more raw data.
Improving the quality of any product can be costly, and economic statistics are
no exception.
(2) Growth rates of productivity are highly variable when measured over
short periods of time. Moreover, rates measured over lengthy periods move
predictably with the business cycle. Consequently, high rates of productivity
growth usually accompany high rates of output growth, often near the beginning
of cyclical expansions. Unfortunately, pundits may seize on a short period of
rapid growth in output and productivity and proclaim that the trend rate of
productivity growth has risen; later in the cycle it will become obvious that
productivity is still near its old trend. When questioning whether the trend has
shifted, it is best to look at a complete business cycle or longer. In the current
cycle one might compare the latest productivity data with data from 1990, the
year in which the peak of the last business cycle occurred, or 1989, the year
in which some measures of the level of productivity peaked.
(3) Extra caution is required when using productivity estimates for individ-
ual segments of the economy. Partitioning the economy introduces an additional
source of error into output and productivity statistics due to the difﬁculty of
distributing inputs and outputs across sectors in a meaningful way. For example,      
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in the BLS industry studies of labor productivity, output is measured as gross
value and thus inputs from other sectors are excluded. Therefore, increased
outsourcing of services in a particular manufacturing industry would appear as
higher measured productivity in that industry even if overall labor productivity
did not change for all ﬁrms combined. But even when outsourcing is taken into
account, as in the BLS multifactor productivity measures for manufacturing, a
more subtle difﬁculty emerges. Suppose prices and quantities were measured
accurately for manufacturing but that unmeasured quality improvements led
to overestimates of price increases for business services. The real quantity
of services used by the manufacturing sector would then be understated, and
manufacturing productivity would be overstated.
3. HOW HAS PRODUCTIVITY BEHAVED OVER TIME?
Many economic historians believe that sustained productivity growth is a rela-
tively recent phenomenon.2 Further, if one concentrates on the relatively recent
period in which sustained productivity growth has been evident in many nations,
one can see a distinct tendency for the world’s productivity to accelerate over
time. This tendency is illustrated in Table 1 with data on per capita real GDP
for several countries from 1820 to 1989. Before discussing the data, note that
productivity statistics are currently not estimated as accurately as we would
like. Moreover, as one moves back in time, the quality of the estimates deterio-
rates. A historian estimating GDP for an economy in the nineteenth century has
only a small fraction of the data that is currently available to national product
statisticians. Also, the quality of data can vary across countries. One particular
problem is with countries that have large sectors where market forces of supply
and demand are suppressed; for those countries, the market value of real output
of the nonmarket sector is difﬁcult to estimate.
Even with these qualiﬁcations, the data can be useful. In particular, one
can note the extent to which productivity growth has risen. Consider ﬁrst the
countries leading in productivity. For most of the nineteenth century the United
Kingdom had the highest level of productivity in the world, with a productiv-
ity growth rate of 1.2 percent from 1820 to 1890. In the twentieth century the
United States has had the highest level of productivity, with a growth rate of 2.0
percent from 1913 to 1989. Next, consider two “growth miracles.”3 From 1950
to 1973, Japan’s productivity level increased by a factor of almost 6, which
resulted in an 8.0 percent annual rate of productivity growth. Over a longer
2 Jones (1988), for example, distinguishes between the last 1,000 years and the rest of
mankind’s existence.
3 These are not the only examples that could have been mentioned; other countries have had
similar periods of rapid growth as well.         
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Table 1 Real Output per Capita
1820 1870 1890 1913 1950 1973 1989
United States 1,219 2,244 3,101 4,846 8,605 14,093 18,282
[1.2 1.6 2.0 1.6 2.2 1.6]
United Kingdom 1,450 2,693 3,383 4,152 5,651 10,079 13,519
[1.2 1.1 0.9 0.8 2.5 1.9]
Germany 902 1,251 1,660 2,506 3,295 10,124 13,752
[0.7 1.4 1.8 0.7 5.0 1.9]
Japan 609 640 842 1,153 1,620 9,524 15,336
[0.1 1.4 1.4 0.9 8.0 3.0]
Taiwan 564 608 706 2,803 7,252
[0.3 0.4 6.2 6.1]
China 497 497 526 557 454 1,039 2,538
[0 0.3 0.2 ¡0.5 3.7 5.7]
India 490 490 521 559 502 719 1,093
[0 0.3 0.3 ¡0.3 1.6 2.7]
Latin Americaa 570 785 998 1,350 2,180 3,661 4,033
[0.3 1.2 1.3 1.4 2.5 0.6]
Africab 400 400 400 580 1,044 1,656 1,660
[0 0 1.6 1.2 1.9 ¡0.3]
[Entries in brackets represent average annual rates of change from the preceding entry.]
aAverage for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.
bAverage for Cote’d Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, and Tanzania.
Notes: The ﬁgures in this table are from Maddison (1994), Table 2.1. Entries are per capita GDP,
stated as dollar amounts at 1985 U.S. relative prices. Entries for Africa from 1820 through 1913
are described by Maddison as rough guesses.
period, 1950–89, Taiwan boosted productivity by a factor of 10, which led to a
6.2 percent annual rate of productivity growth. Such rapid rates of growth are
simply not evident in pre–World War II data. Also, note productivity growth
in the world’s two most populous nations. Productivity stagnated in China and
India for over a century but is now growing. All in all, productivity growth
for countries containing much of the world’s population, at varying stages
of industrialization, has become distinctly faster. That trend, however, is not
universal, with Africa being an important exception.
Two periods of productivity growth in the United States are now con-
sidered. Figure 1 illustrates per capita real GDP since 1869. Despite large
departures during the Great Depression and World War II, this estimate of     
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productivity remains remarkably close to a trend of 2.0 percent annual growth.4
That estimate, however, uses population as a loose proxy for labor input. An-
other view looks at post–World War II data that incorporate a more explicit
measure of labor input, employee-hours. For more than two decades, the trend
rate of productivity growth has been substantially lower than it was early in
the postwar period. For example, multifactor productivity for nonfarm business,
seen in Figure 2, rose at a 1.9 percent annual rate from 1948 to 1973 but only
rose at a 0.1 percent rate from 1973 to 1994. Similar declines are evident in
most other measures of productivity. As shown in Table 1, per capita output
growth simultaneously declined in other mature industrial economies. More-
over, data for the current business cycle reveal no sustained pickup in the rate
of productivity growth. For example, hourly output of nonfarm business grew
at a 1.1 percent rate, both from 1973 to 1989 and from 1989 to 1997.
Since productivity growth leads to higher material standards of living, its
apparent slowing has become the focal point of a large volume of analysis.
There are several possible explanations, but before considering them, it may
be helpful to consider the ultimate sources of productivity growth. If one looks
at simple labor productivity, then physical capital accumulation and improved
education appear to account for a substantial portion of measured productivity
growth. The accumulation of physical and human capital has been extensively
studied and quantiﬁed, and its contribution to the growth of labor productivity
is not controversial. Additional sources of productivity growth include scientiﬁc
and engineering advances, the realization of economies of scale, improvements
in the management of organizations, and the shift in employment from low- to
high-productivity sectors of the economy; these have been less well quantiﬁed,
but the importance of each is also not controversial. Finally, a broad array
of conditions apply to nations as a whole and can affect productivity growth.
These include the effectiveness of the rule of law in predictably protecting
property rights, the level and predictability of tax rates, the incentive effects of
particular taxes and subsidies, the extent and methods of government regulation
of business practices, the ability of a nation’s system of ﬁnancial institutions to
channel funds to productive investment opportunities, and the extent to which
monetary policy achieves low, stable rates of inﬂation over time. The exact
importance of each item in this latter set is open to considerable debate.
4 The measure of GDP used in the ﬁgures in this article differs in an important respect from
that used by Maddison (1994). Whereas Maddison’s GDP data were constructed using a ﬁxed
base period, ofﬁcial data are now constructed using a chain-weighted index for real GDP. One
effect of that difference is to slightly increase growth rates over long periods of time, such as in
Figure 1.  
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Figure 2 Nonfarm Business Sector: Hourly Output and
Multifactor Productivity
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4. DOES MISMEASUREMENT EXPLAIN RECENT
PRODUCTIVITY BEHAVIOR?
Why did the trend rate of productivity growth in the United States and in other
mature industrial economies slow in the early 1970s? Because it is difﬁcult
to measure productivity accurately, it is tempting to blame measurement prob-
lems (see, for example, Nakamura [1997]). In order for measurement problems
to be convicted of that crime, however, analysts must dispel several reason-
able doubts. Exactly what measurement problem suddenly worsened in the late
1960s or the early 1970s? And why did it affect all mature industrial economies
simultaneously? The data in Table 1, for example, indicate that growth of per
capita output declined in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany,
and Japan. Other productivity measures show an even more dramatic slowing.
Until such questions can be answered, many observers will regard as unproven
the hypothesis that an accurate estimate of productivity growth did not slow,
even though measured productivity growth did. This conclusion also applies
to a variant of the mismeasurement view, namely that while true productivity
growth did slow in the 1970s and 1980s, it has rebounded in the 1990s, although
that rebound is not being properly measured.
Zvi Griliches (1994) presented some evidence on the plausibility of the
mismeasurement view. He classiﬁed output into sectors that were relatively
“measurable,” such as manufacturing, and “unmeasurable,” such as ﬁnance. He
then noted that the fraction of output in measurable sectors had declined over
time. Figure 3 uses his classiﬁcation to illustrate how the fraction of output from
well-measured sectors has declined from 43 percent in 1959 to 30 percent in
1994. From one perspective, output has been getting more difﬁcult to measure,
since the poorly measured fraction has increased by 13 percentage points. But
from another perspective, output has always been difﬁcult to measure, since
even in 1959 well-measured output was less than half of total output. For a
quantitative assessment of the two views, consider the following numerical
example. Suppose that productivity actually grew at a 5 percent annual rate in
both the measurable and unmeasurable sectors but that it was incorrectly esti-
mated as zero in the unmeasurable sector. Overall productivity growth would
then have been estimated at 2.15 percent in 1959 and 1.50 percent in 1994.
Thus even these large numerical values that almost certainly overstate the case
would explain only part of the productivity slowdown.
Slifman and Corrado (1996) examined the measurement problem in a dif-
ferent manner. They found that labor productivity in nonfarm business had the
expected slowing: it grew by 2.8 percent from 1960 to 1973 but only 1.1 percent
from 1973 to 1996. But in the nonfarm corporate sector (which accounts for
slightly over three-fourths of nonfarm business) productivity growth changed
little, rising at a 1.8 percent rate from 1960 to 1973 and a 1.6 percent rate from
1973 to 1996. The difference in aggregate productivity behavior reﬂects the    
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Figure 3 “Well-Measured” Output


























Note: Gross domestic product for the (1) Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, (2) Mining, (3) Manu-
facturing, (4) Transportation, (5) Communications, and (6) Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services
industries as a percentage of total gross domestic product.
nonfarm noncorporate sector, composed of proprietorships and partnerships, in
which measured labor productivity rose at a 4.8 percent rate in the earlier period
but fell at a 0.9 percent rate in the later period. Moreover, the proﬁtability of
that sector did not deteriorate even as productivity fell. Thus it appears that this
relatively small part of the economy plays a disproportionately large role in
overall productivity developments and lends credence to the mismeasurement
view. At the same time, it is hard to imagine what form of mismeasurement
accounts for the dramatic change. Also, the data that Slifman and Corrado
presented do not rule out the possibility that the high growth of noncorporate
productivity before 1973 was an aberration.
A ﬁnal possibility of increased mismeasurement around 1973 is raised by
the increased efforts to limit emissions of pollutants. The labor and capital used
to reduce pollution is included in national economic statistics, but beneﬁts like
cleaner air and water are omitted. As a result, increased pollution-control efforts
will reduce measured output and therefore measured productivity. While this
argument is unassailable in principle, one may question its quantitative impact.
For example, pollution abatement and control expenditure has typically been
less than 2 percent of GDP. Also, the largest investments have been made by
ﬁrms in measurable industries, mostly where the productivity slowdown has
been less pronounced (the electric utility industry is a notable exception).       
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5. OTHER EXPLANATIONS OF SLOWER
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
If mismeasurement is not the whole story, then what explains slower produc-
tivity growth? Several possible explanations are presented in this section.
Energy Prices
A large increase in the price of energy was initially a prime suspect. In the
1970s, for example, many authors, such as John Tatom (1979), attributed much
of the productivity slowdown to oil-price increases. The appeal of that hypoth-
esis was in part due to the correspondence of two events: ﬁrst, energy prices
rose rapidly in 1973–74, and second, the year 1973 is often taken to be the
dividing point between high- and low-productivity growth periods.5 Interest in
that explanation waned following the failure of productivity to accelerate after
oil prices declined in the 1980s.
Institutional Sclerosis
Mancur Olson (1988), however, presented a view that could give some impor-
tance to energy-price shocks despite the events of the 1980s. He proposed that
major shocks, such as oil-price increases, can interact with rigidities in politi-
cal systems to magnify the impact of shocks and also can cause the effects of
shocks to persist for long periods of time. The simple story is that a shock that
disturbs the status quo can lead political interest groups to spend resources to
inﬂuence the distribution of output rather than use those resources to produce
output. To the extent that country’s political system is dominated by coalitions
engaged in such behavior, the country is said to exhibit institutional sclerosis. In
essence, Olson explains the productivity slowdown by a combination of initial
shocks, including oil-price increases in the 1970s, magniﬁed and propagated by
sclerotic political systems in large, industrial economies including the United
States.
Two papers provide some support for portions of Olson’s view. Lars
Ljungqvist and Thomas Sargent (1996) present a theoretical analysis, along
with numerical calibration, of features of a prototypical European welfare state.
They found that the labor market’s adjustment to external shocks can be ex-
tremely lengthy and that indirect effects of a shock can be substantial; both are
part of Olson’s story. Also, Richard Vedder (1996) found a negative correlation
between labor productivity growth and spending by the U.S. government for
economic regulation. One would expect to see a negative correlation if reg-
ulations were introduced primarily to affect the distribution of income. The
5 Although it is conventional to take 1973 as the watershed year, by the late 1960s some
analysts were discussing a slowing of productivity growth that had become evident.   
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argument would be stronger, however, if accompanied by an effort to assess
the beneﬁts of the regulations for which costs were extensively tallied.
In Olson’s view, effects of positive shocks are also magniﬁed and prop-
agated through time. For example, a positive shock to a sclerotic economy
could initially be ampliﬁed due to a rising fraction of new, successful ventures.
The positive effects, including higher growth and a lower price level, would
then persist as the degree of sclerosis in the economy declined. That decline
would be a consequence of individuals ﬁnding it more proﬁtable to engage in
productive activity than in seeking to inﬂuence the political process.
Technical Change and Learning
One of the striking features of the post–1973 period has been the falling cost of
computing and the resulting widespread use of computer power. From 1973 to
1996, real gross investment in computers and peripheral equipment increased
by a factor of 892 as the price of computing power fell by a factor of 44. The
coincidence of this technological explosion and falling productivity growth has
puzzled many observers. In an attempt to reconcile the two, Andreas Horn-
stein and Per Krusell (1996) note that people may need substantial amounts
of learning in order to use computers effectively. After modifying a standard
model to require that learning accompany a technological change, they ﬁnd that
a technological change can boost output growth in the long run, even though
it causes an initial period of lower productivity. In addition, they argue that
the use of computers may be especially efﬁcient at increasing the quality of
goods produced. Given the difﬁculties of accounting for quality improvement
in economic statistics, they conclude that growing computer use may worsen
the measurement problem and obscure any rebound in productivity. Griliches
(1994) emphasizes that point by noting that the unmeasureable sector accounts
for fully three-quarters of new computer investment. Also, Baily and Gordon
(1988) present evidence on substantial investments in computing that produce
unmeasured convenience to consumers in several speciﬁc areas.
A complementary theme, proposed by Paul David (1990), identiﬁes paral-
lels between the recent adoption of the computer and the adoption of electric
power a century ago. In each case the technology improved rapidly over a fairly
long time, and the technology gradually moved into widespread use. Even more
intriguing was the pronounced slowing in aggregate productivity growth during
1890–1913, when the world’s two leading economies, the United States and
Britain, rapidly increased their use of electricity. David attributed much of the
delay between the introduction of electricity and improved productivity to a lag
in designing manufacturing facilities that made optimal use of electric motors
and later a lengthy delay before it became proﬁtable to replace older facilities.
He also noted that electriﬁcation led to higher-quality products that would be
mismeasured in economic statistics; for example, electric light greatly improved      
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the quality of illumination, but that effect is ignored in conventional statistics.6
In short, here is a historical example of a revolutionary new technology that
signiﬁcantly raised output in the long run, although the introduction may have
temporarily depressed measured productivity.
Research and Development
To better understand the role of technology on output growth, analysts have
long studied national spending on research and development (R&D) as a proxy
for general scientiﬁc and engineering advances. Gordon Richards (1997) has
incorporated data on R&D spending into a statistical model designed to study
long-run growth. In many ways the model is standard, although it differs
from most by allowing for small increasing returns to scale for all factors
of production taken together. More signiﬁcantly, he departs from the norm by
distinguishing computers from other physical capital stocks and making the
efﬁciency of R&D a function of computer quality, which in his model depends
inversely on the price of computers. One conclusion from his analysis is that
R&D added 1.2 percent to annual labor productivity growth in the 1960s, but
only 0.5 percent from 1973 to 1990, thereby explaining a substantial portion of
the productivity slowdown. Moreover, he found that labor productivity growth
increased in the 1990s, and he projects that increase to continue, with labor
productivity growth peaking at 1.8 percent around 2010 (versus 1.1 percent in
the early 1990s).
An Optimistic Summary
The bits of evidence presented above can be combined into a consistent opti-
mistic scenario. The productivity slowdown was a real phenomenon, although
its severity is overstated by biased economic statistics. The relative growth of
the unmeasurable sector is partly responsible for the overstatement. Further-
more, it is plausible that computers—especially in the unmeasurable sector—
have boosted quality in ways that confound traditional measurement. For one
example, computers have allowed development of several new diagnostic tech-
niques that have made medical treatment much more effective, including com-
puterized tomography (CT) scanners. Trajtenberg (1990) has shown that while
the price of a CT scanner, which would be included in a producer price index or
a GDP price index, increased by a factor of 2.5, its quality-adjusted price index
6 William Nordhaus (1997) provides fascinating details on the provision of lighting through-
out history. Most relevant to David’s (1990) hypothesis, Nordhaus focuses on the cost of providing
what consumers want, namely a given amount of illumination, and contrasts that with the tradi-
tional price-index practice of valuing items like lamps and fuel. The difference between the two
approaches is striking. Whereas the traditional index increased by a factor of three from 1800 to
1992, the true index fell by a factor of 1,000! He further estimates that real output growth has
been underestimated by 0.036 percent per year due to bias in price indexes for lighting alone.      
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fell by a factor of more than 1,400.7 In short, the growing use of computers,
especially in industries for which output is most difﬁcult to measure, explains
why the mismeasurement of productivity could have increased around the time
of the reported slowdown of productivity growth.
Analysts who subscribe to this view expect productivity growth to be higher
in the immediate future. First, part of the measured decline was simply mea-
surement error. Second, the Hornstein-Krusell-David argument would suggest
that although growth has been temporarily depressed, it is nonetheless set to
rebound. A similar prediction comes from Richards’s (1997) statistical analysis,
based on different data. And Olson (1988) provides a rationale for even tem-
porary positive developments to have counterintuitively large and long-lasting
effects.
Since a key part of the optimistic scenario is a high rate of return to R&D,
it may be helpful to consider why many economists might ﬁnd that assumption
plausible. The U.S. economy has become increasingly open to international
trade and investment over the last half century because of lower tariffs, quotas,
and other legal barriers to trade. Also important have been large declines in
unit costs of transportation and communication and a shift in the composition
of items traded from bulk commodities, such as steel, to services and physi-
cally smaller items, such as semiconductors. Why does openness matter? Many
would argue that the U.S. economy has a comparative advantage in generating
new ideas and incorporating them into tradeable products. Expanded trade
therefore would be expected to raise demands for new research, for educated
workers to apply that research, and for computer usage. A higher demand for
new research would lead to a higher rate of return on new research. And as
workers shifted into highly valued research-intensive activities, productivity
would rise.
A Less-Optimistic Scenario
Not all analysts subscribe to the optimistic scenario presented above. For exam-
ple, Robert Gordon (1996b) has argued that total-factor productivity growth in
the United States increased at an annual rate of 0.5 percent or less in much of
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and at an annual rate of 1.5 percent
from 1915 to 1965. Since 1965 it has reverted back to growth at an annual rate
of 0.5 percent or less. To him, the rapid growth from 1915 to 1965 is unusual.
He believes it is due to a few major technological developments, including the
electric motor, the internal combustion engine, communication technology, and
mass entertainment, which includes radio, movies, and television. In his view,
the computer has not had as much of an impact as these earlier developments.
7 Of course, as the better scanner lowers the cost or improves the quality of medical care,
consumer welfare increases and a cost-of-living index for consumers would fall.   
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He therefore believes that at least 1 percentage point of the productivity slow-
down is real and should not be expected to improve. To support his position,
he suggests the thought experiment of comparing the rise in the standard of
living of the average American between 1915 and 1955 with the rise between
1955 and 1995. He ﬁnds the former to be a period of substantial improvement,
with an average person’s daily life literally transformed, but the latter period
to have comparatively little fundamental change.
An important part of Gordon’s (1996b) argument involves a small contri-
bution of computers to productivity growth. Supporting evidence comes from
Daniel E. Sichel (1997), who examined the impact of computers on growth and
found little evidence of a substantial impact. He noted that computer hardware
represents only a small part of the nation’s capital stock; that conclusion does
not change even if software is correctly measured and added to the analysis.
Also, he argued that improvements in ofﬁce automation and information pro-
cessing equipment did not begin with the computer but have been occurring for
over a century. A wide variety of equipment was adopted, including punched-
card tabulators, mechanical calculators, and electric typewriters. He therefore
sees the growing use of computers as a continuation of a trend rather than a
discrete technological shift. In addition, Sichel made the case that mismeasured
output growth does not account for his results.
Charles Jones (1997) took a different approach. He identiﬁed two important
factors, other than capital accumulation and technology, that have had major
impacts on U.S. economic growth. First, median years of schooling for adults
rose from 9.3 years in 1950 to 12.0 years in 1967 and then to 12.8 years
in 1993. Second, the fraction of the labor force consisting of scientists and
engineers engaged in R&D rose from 0.26 percent in 1950 to 0.72 percent in
1967; after a subsequent fall it has risen to 0.78 percent in 1993. For both, the
substantial slowing of improvement after 1967 is striking. Jones’s analysis uses
a fairly conventional statistical model that incorporates increasing levels of both
education and research and allows for modestly increasing returns to scale. In
that model, increases in education or research can boost the steady-state level
of output or productivity, but once the steady state is achieved, there is no effect
on growth rates. He observes that both the amount of schooling per person and
the nation’s research effort must eventually stabilize, and he concludes that as
they stabilize in the future, output growth will slow. Accordingly, he calculates
that productivity growth will also slow to an annual rate of 0.6 percent.
6. RESOLVING THE DIFFERENT VIEWS
The controversy over slowing productivity growth may remind the reader of
the old line that if all the economists in the world were laid end to end, they
wouldn’t reach a conclusion. In this case, the importance of the problem has led      
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Figure 4 Realized Real Interest Rates



















economists to explore possible explanations, but the lack of deﬁnitive data has
prevented a consensus from emerging. More research would clearly be helpful.
In particular, it would at least be useful to have bounds on the probable amount
of bias in price, output, and productivity statistics for several benchmark years.
With such bounds in hand, one could look at interrelations among macroeco-
nomic statistics for indirect evidence on whether either the optimistic or the
pessimistic scenarios could be ruled out.
To illustrate the value of such bounds, consider the behavior of real interest
rates. Figure 4 shows the movements over time of one measure of ex post real
rates, the one-year Treasury rate for each January minus the next 12-month
percentage change in the consumer price index, excluding volatile food and
energy prices (core CPI). Economic theory states that real rates should move
with productivity growth; thus, for example, if the trend rate of productivity
growth were to increase, that would tend to raise real interest rates.8 Now
suppose that we knew that there was no ongoing change in the amount of bias
8 Of course, other factors also affect interest rates. In the ﬁgure, at least part of the down-
trend in the 1960s and 1970s reﬂected the slow adjustment of expectations and institutions to an
inﬂationary monetary policy, and the upward spike in 1982 represents the shift to a disinﬂationary
monetary policy. One also could adjust for other items that could have affected interest rates, such
as the business cycle or ﬁscal policy.       
62 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
in the core CPI.9 One could then look for a trend in real rates. The absence of
a downward trend would contradict the pessimistic story.
One could look at other relationships as well, such as real wages tracking
the trend in productivity growth. The point is to have some bounds on move-
ments of measurement biases over time; naturally, the tighter the bounds, the
sharper the inferences that can be made. Also, the normal course of research
will reveal which of the empirical studies mentioned above can withstand tests
of replication by different authors and checks for robustness of the results
to minor speciﬁcation changes. And normal research will either tighten the
theoretical work that is loosely speciﬁed or point out any internal inconsisten-
cies discovered. Then we will better understand the productivity experience of
the last half century.
7. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The Monthly Labor Review, published by the BLS, often contains articles on
the behavior of productivity and the preparation of productivity statistics. In
addition, it contains tables that display recent data from each of the productivity
programs.
The BLS also periodically publishes the BLS Handbook of Methods. This
is an invaluable document for anyone wanting an in-depth explanation of the
procedures used by the BLS to calculate economic statistics. Chapters 10 and
11 deal with productivity and were important sources for the preparation of
this article.
The BLS makes a large volume of historical data and news releases avail-
able on the Internet (http://www.bls.gov). Some of its publications are also
available at its web site, including the Handbook of Methods.
Since the output portion of productivity statistics comes from the National
Income and Product Accounts, readers may ﬁnd it helpful to consult the Sur-
vey of Current Business for articles about the preparation of GDP and related
statistics. A convenient source of methodological articles from that publication
is the web site of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.doc.gov).
9 If the bias in measuring the CPI were increasing, that would bias estimates of real interest
rates downward.    
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